Causation requirement in trade remedy investigations has produced significant controversy in terms of legal interpretation and economic analysis. Deficient treaty texts and confusing legal ruling have exacerbated practical difficulty for investigating authorities to ensure World Trade Organization (WTO) consistency. Various analytical models that were proposed on the basis of more articulated economics often turn out to be too complicated to apply in broader cases or critically contingent on data availability. We suggest an alternative approach that utilizes firm production costs to complement the previous models.
INTRODUCTION
The multilateral trade agreements such as General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements as well as national regulations dealing with trade remedy systems stipulate a 'causation' requirement as one of the essential elements for utilizing trade remedy measures. Imports, whether dumped, subsidized, or increased due to market liberalization, must be shown to have 'caused' injury to domestic industries producing like or directly competitive products. This seemingly simple task has been the focal point for long controversy among economists and lawyers because there is no explicit guidance as to how causation requirements should be applied in trade remedy investigations. 1 The lack of more articulated criteria is indeed puzzling, given that other legal elements involving dumping and subsidy margin calculation or injury determination are substantially articulated and causation is an essential requirement as important as those elements. 2 The key question still to be resolved is how to determine whether the increase in imports is the true cause of injury to the domestic industry and not a consequence of that injury. The economic analysis on the causal relationship between imports and the pertinent domestic industry does not seem to conform to the legal interpretation of causation requirements, or vice versa. For example, the panel's ruling in Argentina -Footwear illustrates that coincidence between an upward trend in imports and downward trends in the injury factors is important evidence for causation determination.
3 Such a finding of coincidence, however, does contradict the most elementary economic lesson for causation analysis. The panel in US -Steel Safeguard, for example, emphasized the need for a more articulated econometric analysis in relation to causation determination. 4 Truth be told, correlation and causation have been a philosophical conundrum for centuries and a central question that remains to be debated in many academic disciplines. In this article, we propose an additional tool that can be used to refine causation analysis for trade remedy systems. First, building on Kelly's model, we introduce the 'Cost of Production Test' that addresses the problems stemming from one of the false assumptions adopted in the original model. Our new approach, as it turns out, also helps meet the nonattribution requirement. Second, we suggest applying the 'Insufficient and Non-redundant Parts of Unnecessary but Sufficient Cause (INUS)' condition to ascertain the philosophical definition of 'genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect' that is required for safeguard actions, presenting a viable alternative to prior -and often criticized -standards for safeguard action.
RULES IN WTO, UNITED STATES AND EU

ANTI-DUMPING REGULATION
The WTO Anti-dumping (AD) Agreement requires the 'demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry' and the non-attribution analysis for other known factors injuring the domestic industry. The AD Agreement agreed at the Kennedy Round negotiation, which did not enter into force due to the opposition by the US Congress, showed an important difference in terms of causation requirements for anti-dumping actions. The relevant articles are given as follows: 5 Article 3. Determination of Injury (a)A determination of injury shall be made only when the authorities concerned are satisfied that the dumped imports are demonstrably the principal cause of material injury or of threat of material injury to a domestic industry or the principal cause of material retardation of the establishment of such an industry. In reaching their decision the authorities shall weigh, on one hand, the effect of the dumping and, on the other hand, all other factors taken together which may be adversely affecting the industry. The determination shall in all cases be based on positive findings and not on mere allegations or hypothetical possibilities. [. . .] (b) In order to establish whether dumped imports have caused injury, all other factors which, individually or in combination, may be adversely affecting the industry shall be examined, for example: the volume and prices of undumped imports of the product in question, competition between the domestic producers themselves, contraction in demand due to substitution of other products or to changes in consumer tastes.
In the original wording, causal relationship between dumped imports and industry injury is stipulated as 'demonstrably the principal cause'. Moreover, it demands weighing the effects of the dumping versus 'all other factors taken together which may be adversely affecting the industry', although the provision does not elaborate on how to conduct a comparison between dumping and all other factors. 'All other factors' include 'the volume and prices of undumped imports of the product in question, competition between the domestic producers themselves, contraction in demand due to substitution of other products or to changes in consumer tastes' that are indeed typical elements to aggravate or create domestic industry injury.
However, this principal causality test contradicted the existing US anti-dumping regulations, which specifically required 'a causal link but. . .not. . .that dumped imports must be a principal cause, or a major cause, or a substantial cause of injury caused by all factors contributing to overall injury to an industry'. 6 That was in fact the main reason for the US Congress to veto the first AD Agreement concluded under the auspice of the GATT. Another problem of the above provision is that it was susceptible to different interpretations, creating ambiguity to the critical element of an anti-dumping system. For example, it was not clear whether dumped imports must be themselves the cause of material injury or the principal causal factor for material injury resulted by all injurious factors. 7 The Tokyo Round negotiation modified several parts of the original AD Agreement so that it could be accepted by major GATT contracting parties including the United States. One of the critical changes was the causation requirement, which was finalized as below: 8 Article 3. Determination of Injury (c) It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, causing injury within the meaning of this Code. There may be other factors which at the same time are injuring the industry, and the injuries caused by other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports.
(d) The effect of the dumped imports shall be assessed in relation to the domestic production of the like product when available data permit the separate identification of production in terms of such criteria as: the production process, the producers' realizations, profits. When the domestic production of the like product has no separate identity in these terms the effects of the dumped imports shall be assessed by the examination of the production of the narrowest group or range of products, which includes the like product, for which the necessary information can be provided.
The principal causation requirement was eliminated and instead replaced with the demonstration of mere 'causation'. Moreover, the requirement to 'weigh' the effect of the dumping and all other factors was discarded and replaced with mere non-attribution analysis. This provision was further elaborated during the Uruguay Round negotiation to require the demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury 'based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities'. The investigating authorities must examine 'any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry', which include 'the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry'.
The European Community (EC) adopted essentially the same provision as the WTO AD Agreement with respect to causation requirement. 9 In contrast, section 1673 of the US Trade Act stipulates that injury must occur 'by reason of' dumped merchandise. Although the legal discrepancy between 'cause' and 'by reason of' tests is not obvious, it is generally understood that the US anti-dumping act stipulates the same standard as the WTO AD Agreement. In other words, there is no need for dumping to be the sole or principal cause of injury and to be weighed against other factors.
10 In fact, the legislative guidelines such as the Statements of Administrative Action or the Senate Report for the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 emphasized that the 'by reason of' standard did not require dumped imports to be the 'principal', 'major', 'substantial', or a 'significant' cause.
11 In addition, the US Court of International Trade repeatedly confirmed that the International Trade Commission (ITC) was precluded from weighing causes of injury 12 and that the existence of other contributing causes of injury was irrelevant if there was substantial evidence that a causal nexus existed between imports and injury. It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry.
United States 14
If -(2) the Commission determines that -(A) an industry in the US -(i) is materially injured, or (ii) is threatened with material injury, or (B) the establishment of an industry in the US is materially retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for importation, then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an anti-dumping duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, in an amount equal to the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price (or the constructed export price) for the merchandise. For purposes of this section and section 1673d (b)(1) of this title, a reference to the sale of foreign merchandise includes the entering into of any leasing arrangement regarding the merchandise that is equivalent to the sale of the merchandise.
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Article 3 -Determination of Injury 6. It must be demonstrated, from all the relevant evidence presented in relation to paragraph 2, that the dumped imports are causing injury within the meaning of this Regulation. Specifically, this shall entail a demonstration that the volume and/or price levels identified pursuant to paragraph 3 are responsible for an impact on the Community industry as provided for in paragraph 5, and that this impact exists to a degree which enables it to be classified as material. 7. Known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the Community industry shall also be examined to ensure that injury caused by these other factors is not attributed to the dumped imports under paragraph 6. Factors which may be considered in this respect include the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, restrictive trade practices of, and competition between, third country and Community producers, developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the Community industry.
and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement is parallel to Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement. Causation-related provisions in US laws 16 and EC Regulations 17 also stipulate the same legal requirement. Therefore, there is no difference from the above discussion for anti-dumping regulation in terms of interpretation and application of causation requirement.
Unlike AD Agreement, the SCM Agreement was first concluded only in the Tokyo Round negotiation. So, the causation requirement that was controversial in the Kennedy Round AD Code was already modified in accordance with the Tokyo Round AD Code.
SAFEGUARD REGULATION
The legal text of the Safeguard Agreement concerning causation requirement does not differ from those of the AD Agreement or the SCM Agreement. The treaty text requires the increased imports to 'cause' or 'threaten to cause' serious injury to a domestic industry. The interpretation of this causation requirement, however, perhaps raised the most controversial issue about the WTO safeguard system. 18 The main reason for this controversy is that safeguard action does not require any unfair trade practices. So the argument that the causation requirement in the context of safeguard actions should be stricter than that for anti-dumping or countervailing actions appears to be very compelling. Moreover, Article 4 of the Safeguard Agreement stipulates non-attribution requirement, which is basically identical to those of anti-dumping and countervailing actions.
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the causation requirements of the US and Canadian safeguard regulations are different from the WTO Safeguard Agreement. As quoted in Table 2 , the US trade laws stipulate that imports must be 'substantial cause' of serious injury. This substantial cause requirement is interpreted as 'a cause which is important and not less than any other cause'. The same legal requirement for causation -'an important cause that is no less important than any other cause of the serious injury or threat' -appears in the Canadian regulation, 19 although a different term of 'principal cause' is used. 
LEGAL PRACTICES AND INTERPRETATION
The legal application of causation requirement for trade remedy actions is divided into two elements: (i) causal relationship between imports -dumped, subsidized, or merely increased imports -and injury to a domestic industry, and (ii) non-attribution of injury caused by 16 In the investigation to determine whether increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry under the terms of this Agreement, the competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and employment.
(b) The determination referred to in subparagraph (a) shall not be made unless this investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the existence of the causal link between increased imports of the product concerned and serious injury or threat thereof. When factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports.
Unite States 21
Section 2251. Action to facilitate positive adjustment to import competition
If the United States International Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to in this part as the 'Commission') determines under section 2252(b) of this title that an article is being imported into the US in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported article, the President, in accordance with this part, shall take all appropriate and feasible action within his power which the President determines will facilitate efforts by the domestic industry to make a positive adjustment to import competition and provide greater economic and social benefits than costs. (1) In making determinations under subsection (b) of this section, the Commission shall take into account all economic factors which it considers relevant, including (but not limited to) (C) with respect to substantial cause, an increase in imports (either actual or relative to domestic production) and a decline in the proportion of the domestic market supplied by domestic producers.
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Article 5 2. Using as a basis the factors described in Article 10, the investigation shall seek to determine whether imports of the product in question are causing or threatening to cause serious injury to the Community producers concerned.
Continued on next page
21 USC, ss 2251 and 2252. 22 EU AD Regulation. factors other than imports. These legal elements bring about much controversy over, for example, how to prove causal relationship, and what is to be shown for finding factors other than imports that cause injury to meet the non-attribution requirement.
The main principles for legal application drawn from WTO jurisprudence are as follows: first, apply non-attribution principle and, second, establish causal relationship between imports and domestic injury. The crucial rulings by the WTO panels and Appellate Body related to these issues are summarized and analysed below.
AD AGREEMENT
Non-attribution
In US -Hot-Rolled Steel, 23 the panel opined that non-attribution does not require investigating authority to identify the extent of injury caused by other factors in order to isolate
Article 10
Examination of the trend of imports, of the conditions in which they take place and of serious injury or threat of serious injury to Community producers resulting from such imports shall cover in particular the following factors:
a. the volume of imports, in particular where there has been a significant increase, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the Community;
b. the price of imports, in particular where there has been a significant price undercutting as compared with the price of a like product in the Community; c. the consequent impact on Community producers as indicated by trends in certain economic factors such as: -production; -capacity utilization; -stocks; -sales; -market share; -prices (i.e. depression of prices or prevention of price increases which would normally have occurred); -profits; -return on capital employed; -cash flow; -employment. d. factors other than trends in imports which are causing or may have caused injury to the Community producers concerned. the injury caused by them from the injury caused by dumped imports. 24 Instead, the panel ruled that the investigating authority was required to conduct an examination sufficient to ensure that material injury was not caused by factors other than these imports. 25 This rather loose interpretation by a GATT panel was reversed by the Appellate Body.
The Appellate Body in US -Hot-rolled Steel ruled that non-attribution analysis 'must involve separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of the other factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports', 26 while the particular methods and approaches to carry out the process of separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of dumped imports from the injurious effects of other known causal factors are not prescribed by the AD Agreement.
27 The Appellate Body further explained that it requires 'a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of the injurious effects of the other factors, as distinguished from the injurious effects of the dumped imports', 28 no matter how difficult it may be as a practical matter.
The implication of this ruling is profound. It appears that quantitative methodology such as econometric analysis is now indispensable to provide 'a satisfactory explanation of both the nature and extent of the injurious effects' of other factors as well as dumped imports. Only rigorous quantifiable analysis would be able to satisfy such detailed prescription for non-attribution requirements.
Moreover, this decision naturally raises a relevant question of whether the nonattribution analysis requires the comparison of injurious effects of other factors as opposed to dumped imports, probably as the next step of separation and distinction of injurious effects. In this regard, EC -Tube or Pipe Fitting raised the issue of whether the nonattribution provision requires an investigating authority to examine the effects of the other causal factors collectively after having examined them individually.
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In fact, the EC identified other factors such as imports from third countries not subject to investigation, decline in consumption, and substitution. 30 With respect to each of the factors, the EC concluded that the extent of the contribution to injury was not significant and thereby not such as to have broken the causal link between dumped imports and material injury. Brazil claimed that this 'significant contribution test' as applied to individual factor was inconsistent with Article 3.5 because the collective effect of insignificant factors might collectively constitute a significant cause of injury. In other words, the EC and Brazil contested how to weigh or compare the extent of injurious effects between dumped imports and other factors. 24 This is actually drawn from the decision in US -Imposition of Anti-dumping Duties The Appellate Body, however, ruled that 'Article 3.5 does not compel, in every case, an assessment of the collective effects of other causal factors, because such an assessment is not always necessary to conclude that injuries ascribed to dumped imports are actually caused by those imports and not by other factors'.
31 Thus, the Appellate Body clarified that the crucial element of the non-attribution analysis is to separate and distinguish injurious effects of other factors from that of dumped import; not to make a quantitative comparison among them. This ruling may be understood as an attempt to qualify potentially too difficult of a requirement implied by the decision in US -Hot-rolled Steel.
In all, the Appellate Body decisions concerning the non-attribution requirement have made the relevant analysis unnecessarily or disproportionately complicated considering its purpose or utility. Even after scrutinizing the nature and extent of injurious effects of individual factors, the separation of their effects is the ultimate goal. As long as dumped imports can be shown to have a causal relationship with injury after such non-attribution, the anti-dumping duty is typically determined by the whole dumping margin -or injury margin in countries that adopt the lesser duty rule -regardless of the extent of injurious effect of dumped imports. 32 The lack of the linkage between causation and anti-dumping measures is contrasted to the case of safeguard actions.
Causal Relationship
The AD Agreement does not specify what should be shown to vindicate the causal relationship between dumped imports and domestic injury. In addition, the AD Agreement does not require the investigating authority to determine that dumped imports are the sole cause of injury. The panel in US -Hot-Rolled Steel ruled that there is no obligation in Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement that an investigating authority 'demonstrate that dumped imports alone have caused material injury by deducting the injury caused by other factors from the overall injury found to exist, in order to determine whether the remaining injury rises to the level of material injury'. 33 Despite substantial elaboration of the AD Agreement through rulings for the WTO disputes, no case has directly addressed the issue of what must be shown for causal relationship under Article 3.5. In fact, the WTO disputes raising causation issues normally focused on non-attribution analysis or other known factors instead of causal relationship per se. 34 For example, in US -Softwood Lumber VI, 35 the panel ruled that the causal analysis was inconsistent with the AD Agreement because the determination of substantially 31 Appellate Body Report, EC -Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 191. 32 Some commentators wrote that 'causal requirement has been read in a proceduralist manner'. P. Mavroidis increased imports was already in violation. Likewise, in Thailand -H-Beams, 36 the panel found Thailand's determination of a causal relationship to be in error under Articles 3.5 in light of the earlier finding that price effects was inconsistent. In EC -Bed Linen (Article 21.5-India), 37 the panel rejected India's claim on EC's causation analysis because the market share figures referred to by India were not those on which the EC decision was based. In other words, the panel concluded that India failed to demonstrate the prima facie case that an unbiased and objective investigating authority could have reached the EC causation determination.
SCM AGREEMENT
Causal Relationship
The WTO jurisprudence has not yet clarified what kind or extent of causal link must be shown to satisfy causation requirement. However, the panel in US -Lumber VI explained that the causation determination must be based at least on correct factual proof. 38 Given that ITC's determination of substantially increased imports was found to be in violation of the SCM Agreement, the panel concluded that the causal analysis cannot be consistent with the SCM Agreement because a fundamental element of causal analysis is flawed.
Non-attribution
The panel in US -Lumber VI explained that 'although it has not been specifically considered in a countervailing duty case, given that the relevant provisions in the two Agreements are identical, and in light of the Declaration of Ministers relating to Dispute Settlement under the AD and SCM Agreements, it is clear to us that the requirement is the same in the context of both anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations'. 39 Therefore, rulings concerning the non-attribution element in the AD cases are to be applied for SCM disputes. In addition to the AD jurisprudence, the cases relating to the SCM Agreement contain a few more elaboration.
First non-attribution requirement mandates the finding of the extent as well as the nature of the injurious effects of the other factors. The panel ruled that:
it does not suffice for an investigating authority merely to 'check the box'. An investigating authority must do more than simply list other known factors, and then dismiss their role with bare qualitative assertions, such as 'the factor did not contribute in any significant way to the injury', or 'the factor did not break the causal link between subsidized imports and material injury.' In our view, an investigating authority must make a better effort to quantify the impact of other known factors, relative to subsidized imports, preferably using elementary economic constructs or models. At the very least, the non-attribution language of Article 15.5 requires from an investigating authority a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of the injurious effects of the other factors, as distinguished from the injurious effects of the subsidized imports. 41 (Italic in the original report)
Based on the above explanation, the panel noted that the EC failed to examine the extent of the negative effects of economic downturn in the market, overcapacity, and other nonsubsidized import, although those factors are acknowledged as relevant factors to cause injury. Such decision may be one of the most economics-oriented approaches that embrace a quantitative analysis as an essential element for non-attribution requirements. Second, the failure of an investigating authority to evaluate factors whose relevance is explicitly acknowledged constitutes a breach of the non-attribution obligation. For example, in the US -Lumber VI case, the panel ruled that the failure of the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) to discuss the likely future effects of domestic supplies of lumber was a 'glaring omission' and thereby violation of Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement. 42 This ruling does not specifically address how much 'relevant' other factors should be taken into account for non-attribution analysis. However, insofar as the relevance of a factor is acknowledged by an investigating authority, the effect of that factor must be examined and explained with adequate reasoning.
Causation Issues for Serious Prejudice
Although it is not prescribed as expressly as in a countervailing investigation case, actionable subsidy may be challenged if serious prejudice to another WTO member's interest is shown to be caused by a subsidy. Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement implies the causation requirement for serious prejudice determination by providing that 'the effect of the subsidy' is to displace or impede trade, price undercutting or depression, or increase of market share.
In fact, the panel in Korea -Commercial Vessels noted that there must be a causal relationship between the subsidy and the effects described in Article 6.3 of SCM Agreement. 43 The prices would have been in the absence of the subsidy. 44 The actual application of this 'but for' test is more clearly shown in US -Upland Cotton. 45 The panel concluded that four main factors -(i) substantial proportionate influence of the United States in the world upland cotton market; (ii) US subsidy programmes directly linked to world prices for upland cotton; (iii) discernable temporal coincidence of suppressed world market prices and the price-contingent US subsidies; and (iv) credible evidence concerning the divergence between US upland cotton producers' total production costs and sales revenue since 1997 -supported 'the proposition that US upland cotton producers would not have been economically capable of remaining in the production of upland cotton had it not been for the US subsidies at issue and that the effect of the subsidies was to allow US producers to sell upland cotton at a price lower than would otherwise have been necessary to cover their total costs'. 46 Notwithstanding any textual basis in the SCM Agreement, the panel in US -Upland Cotton applied the non-attribution analysis to serious prejudice determination. 47 The panel in Korea -Commercial Vessels also considered that a non-attribution analysis in the context of serious prejudice determination is 'logical and appropriate'. 48 In other words, the panel is required to analyse the effects of identified factors other than the subsidies with a view to determining whether such factors would attenuate any affirmative causal link or render insignificant the effects of the subsidy. The causation requirement for a safeguard measure is particularly important because increased import itself without any wrongful activities from exporting countries becomes the basis of safeguard application:
Applying our standard of review, we will consider whether Argentina's causation analysis meets these requirements on the basis of (i) whether an upward trend in imports coincides with downward trends in the injury factors, and if not, whether a reasoned explanation is provided as to why nevertheless the data show causation; (ii) whether the conditions of competition in the Argentine footwear market between imported and domestic footwear as analysed demonstrate, on the basis of objective evidence, a causal link of the imports to any injury; and (iii) whether other relevant factors have been analysed and whether it is established that injury caused by factors other than imports has not been attributed to imports.
Non-attribution
The Appellate Body explained that the interpretation for non-attribution requirements in the AD Agreement and the Safeguard Agreement provides guidance for each other.
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Therefore, investigating authorities are required to 'identify the nature and extent of the injurious effects of the known factors other than increased imports, as well as explain satisfactorily the nature and extent of the injurious effects of those other factors as distinguished from the injurious effects of the increased imports'. 52 The Appellate Body also clarified that the non-attribution analysis must be undertaken before the final determination about the existence of the causal link between increased imports and serious injury. 53 It is noteworthy that the panel in US -Steel Safeguards emphasized the importance of quantitative analysis for non-attribution analysis. The panel ruled that 'a competent authority may find itself in situations where quantification and some form of economic analysis are necessary to rebut allegedly plausible alternative explanations that have been put 50 Ibid., para. 458. forward', 54 although 'the results of such quantification may not necessarily be determinative'. 55 Regarding the criteria for quantitative analysis, the panel provides that 56 :
Regarding argumentation by the parties as to the form which quantification should take, the Panel considers that this will depend again upon the complexity of the situation under consideration. The approach adopted should enable a competent authority to apportion, even roughly, the injury attributable to factors other than increased imports that may come into play in the context of a particular industry. The more complex the situation, the more necessary a sophisticated analysis becomes. Whatever approach or model is adopted, it should be applied in good faith and with due diligence. It seems to us that this is demanded by the good faith interpretation and application of Articles 2.1, 4.2(b) and 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
The above explanation implies the need to adopt econometric methods for non-attribution analysis. This ruling demanding more rigorous scrutiny can be understood in relation to the decision concerning the permitted level of safeguard measures. Contrary to the cases for antidumping and countervailing duties, the Appellate Body concluded that a safeguard measure should be applied so as to address only the consequences of imports, not the entirety of the serious injury. 57 Since the level of a safeguard measure is now contingent on the effects of imports to serious injury, the quantitative evaluation of effects of all contributing factors becomes critical in implementing safeguard measures. The application of non-attribution approach to the imposition of a safeguard measure cannot be taken in the imposition of anti-dumping or countervailing duty that is based on dumping or subsidy margin instead of injury margin, unless an investigating authority voluntarily employs a lesser duty rule. 
Causal Relationship
The panel in US -Wheat Gluten ruled that, following the non-attribution analysis, the effects caused by other factors must be excluded totally from the determination of serious injury so as to ensure that these effects are not 'attributed' to the increased imports and the effects caused by increased imports alone must be capable of causing serious injury. 59 In other words, the panel explained that the increased imports must be sufficient, in and of themselves, to cause serious injury. Rejecting this interpretation, the Appellate Body ruled that the investigating authority must show 'the causal link' between increased imports and serious injury, which means 'a genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect' between these two elements. 60 How to establish a genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect between increased imports and serious injury remains to be elaborated in future cases.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR CAUSATION ANALYSIS
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
One of the most frequently adopted economic models to analyse causation issue is the econometric analysis that is supposed to show the degree of causal relationship between pre-chosen factors and a dependent variable. Grossman developed an estimated equation that can be used for counterfactual analysis, which can determine the sensitivity of domestic production to the relative price of imports, the relative price of inputs, and overall demand. 61 Based on the empirical relationship between employment figures and its determinants, 62 he used the model to test the steel industry as an example. In his conclusion, he argues that the USITC claims of Bethlehem Steel Corporation and the United Steel Workers of America were unwarranted, since his counterfactual test found secular factors (e.g., faster than average growth of employment and productivity in the high-technology and service sectors) to be a more important factor than imports in causing employment loss. Rotemberg and Pindyck, using the copper industry as an example, also developed a similar framework using Granger causality regressions to ascertain the amount of injury caused by imports. 63 The econometric approach offers a detailed quantitative approach to causation analysis and offers answers to attribution. Yet, it also suffers from many limitations. As Sykes points out, there is the practical difficulty of gathering all the necessary data to perform accurate calculations. 64 This is especially true for smaller or under-scrutinized industries, where very limited information is available. As Irwin points out, there is also no clear-cut way of determining which factors are appropriate for the empirical model. 65 Such limitations have contributed to the relatively infrequent application of econometric tools in trade remedy decisions.
ELASTICITY/PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
Another model frequently used for causation analysis is a partial equilibrium model that is based on supply and demand conditions of the market. This method often requires estimation of elasticity to ascertain market supply and demand.
In a seminal work using this method, Kelly advocated a model that attributes change in domestic production into three factors -shift in import supply, shift in domestic demand, and shift in domestic supply. 66 With informed guesses about relevant elasticity, Kelly estimated the effects of import supply curve relative to other factors. Irwin expanded upon Kelly's 1988 study to articulate a more refined causation standard. For example, Irwin observed that in the Lamb case, 'domestic price rose (and import prices rose substantially) and consumption fell while domestic production declined and imports increased'. 67 According to Irwin, such result is more consistent with domestic supply curve inward shift rather than import increase being an independent causal factor.
This approach has the advantages that it does not require econometric estimations and that it is applicable to three divergent market settings -a competitive market where imports and domestic goods are perfect substitutes, a competitive market in which imports and domestic goods are imperfect substitutes, and a market where the domestic firm has market power. 68 Another advantage of this model is the practicality stemming from simplicity of its data requirement: it only requires market data -consumption level, domestic production level, imports, unit value -and the elasticity value for domestic demand curve, domestic supply curve, and import supply curve. The major shortcomings of this model are twofold: first, it still necessitates the use of subjective judgments in remedy investigations; second, it assumes that correlation is a necessary condition for causation, which depicts false reality, as discussed in section 5.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH FOR CAUSATION ANALYSIS
FALSE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE EXTANT WTO CASE LAW
Article 2 of the SG Agreement allows for safeguards when 'a product is being imported in such increased quantities, absolute, or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury'. Generally speaking, the causation test used to determine the legality of safeguard measures in WTO case law has centred upon analysing the overall coincidence between import surge and domestic industry harm. In Argentina-Footwear, for example, the Appellate Body affirmed that in an analysis of causation, 'It is the relationship between the movements in imports and the movements in injury factors that must be central to a causation analysis and determination.' 69 Irwin observed that in the current state of affairs, 'both the ITC and WTO panels seem to agree that the coincidence of a higher level of import and a lower level of domestic activity usually constitutes sufficient evidence that imports have caused injury'. 70 In other words, causation analysis often means no more than the finding of mere correlation. 66 Kenneth Kelly, 'The Analysis of Causality in Escape Clause Cases', Journal of Industrial Economics 37 (1988): 187. 67 Irwin, supra n. 65, at 312. 68 Sykes, supra n. 1, at 200. 69 Appellate Body Report, Argentina -Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Argentina -Footwear), WT/DS121/ AB/R, adopted 12 Jan. 2000, DSR 2000:I, 515, para. 144. 70 Irwin, supra n. 65, at 301.
This approach is systematically flawed for the purpose of causation analysis in trade remedy investigations. Specifically, equating correlation to causation would eliminate from consideration two distinct -yet important -cases where clear injury could occur as a result of imports, yet no correlation can be established.
First is the case where firms that did well despite injury would not seek remedy because they cannot establish correlation (and investigating agencies such as the USITC would not bring it up because they categorically exclude these firms as having been injured). For example, an industry might have grown by 300% had there been no import harm, but because of dumping or illegal subsidies by another nation, it may have just grown by 50%. In this case, there was import increase and unfair trade practices, but no industry decline. This illustrates a false assumption in the extant causation analysis model that industries must be at low state of profitability or at a stage of decline to qualify for protection under the trade remedy system. That seems far from reality. It is certainly possible that firms that have high profit margins or even an industry that is rapidly growing (e.g., infant-stage industries) could be suffering from dumping or subsidization from other countries.
For the purpose of safeguard, this is not an important consideration. After all, the very purpose of safeguard actions is to permit temporary protection for declining or seriously injured domestic industries. However, the purpose of anti-dumping and countervailing duties is to punish cheaters -not to have temporary 'reorganizing time' for declining industries. Indeed, the language of the agreements support this view: anti-dumping and countervailing policies only require 'material injury', while safeguard requires 'serious injury'.
Second is the case where correlation cannot be established because of the very nature of profit driven firms. The often-used index that measures harm in domestic industries is the level of production and industry employment data. 71 Microeconomic theory of production tells us that these figures may not reflect upon actual industry harm, at least in the short run. According to the theory, any profit-maximizing firm, in the short run, 72 will produce up to the point where marginal cost equals that of marginal revenue (e.g., market-clearing price of the good), since fixed costs cannot be altered in the short run.
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That is, rational firms will produce even if they will be making negative profits because of sunk cost. In the long run, however, firms need to consider fixed cost and will only produce up to the point where marginal revenue equals the average cost of production.
This tells us that correlation between increased imports and decreased production in a strict temporal sense will only appear when the marginal revenue of domestic firms drops so 71 Ibid.; Grossman, supra n. 61. 72 Short run is a time frame where at least one factor of production is fixed, whereas long run is the time where all production formula can be altered. See N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 4th edn (Madison, OH: Thomson, 2007) , at 280. 73 Fixed costs include costs like labour and overhead costs, which are often unalterable in the short run by employment contracts and the nature of sunk costs. significantly so that it will be below those firms' average costs, or if the firms are in a particular industry where all production formula can be altered rapidly. By the same token, this means that firms whose long run constitutes several years and firms that happen to have large fixed costs will have difficulty showing the evidence of declining production even though they are in fact suffering from dumping or subsidization. In other words, those firms may be categorically denied of trade remedy protection due to the nature of production and cost structures of rational firms. 74 The fact that production decisions of firms may critically depend on time horizon suggests more rigorous consideration of short run versus long run. Otherwise, firms may not show symptoms of decline during the time period of import increase, thus potentially denying declining industry with legally deserving trade remedy measures.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO SOLVE THE CAUSATION CONUNDRUM:
'COST OF PRODUCTION TEST'
As many philosophers have come to terms with, there is simply no way to prove or directly observe causation; only correlation can be observed. Therefore, correlation is an exceedingly valuable figure that can be complemented by relevant facts to infer causality. In that sense, Irwin and Kelly's causation model that uses correlation as one of the underlying framework for causation analysis can be a good starting point in causation analysis.
We propose an alternative approach that modifies and builds on the model used by Irwin and Kelly to address the concerns raised in section 5.1. A critical assumption made in Irwin and Kelly's model is that the causal link 'requires objective evidence that harm to an industry coincides with a period of increased imports or import penetration'. 75 In logical terms, this is stating that correlation is necessary -but not sufficient in itself -to prove causation. We reject this assumption. We argue that correlation, in a strict temporal sense, is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition to prove causation. That is, because of the two rationales stated above, correlation will not be observed in many instances, even when there is genuine harm caused by increase in imports. 76 Correlation, for example, will not be observed when rational firms show symptoms of decline five years after the increase in imports, because they take into account the ubiquity of sunk cost. Correlation may also simply be a temporal coincidence to industry decline, rather than a cause. To ameliorate 74 In US -Steel Safeguards, the dispute panel even acknowledged that temporal lag may exist between import increase and injury 'in certain cases'. 75 Irwin, supra n. 65, at 301. 76 Since causation may be proved without proving strict temporal correlation, correlation is not a necessary condition to prove causation. this problem, we propose an additional tool that can be used as complement to Elasticity/ Partial Equilibrium Model. We propose the following hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1)
If the price of imports is less than the domestic marginal cost of production, we should see an immediate decline in production that is attributable to import surge.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2)
If the price of imports is greater than the domestic marginal cost of production but lower than the domestic average cost of production, we should not observe immediate decline in production that is attributable to import surge; instead, we should expect decline sometime in the future.
HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3)
If the import price is greater than the domestic average cost of production, we should not see an immediate nor future decline that is attributable to import increase. Figure 1 shows how a firm's cost structure can be utilized in relation to causation analysis. At any given level of production, Q 0 , an import price lower than the marginal cost of production would cause immediate production decline and thereby become the primary causal factor for industry injury. To the contrary, an import price higher than the average cost of production would not generally be considered as the main causal factor for industry injury.
This model is widely applicable, 77 including competitive markets and markets where domestic firms have market power, since output decisions based on production costs are the same regardless of the market power possessed by firms. 78 Below, we present five cases that illustrate the usefullness of our model.
The first is a safeguard case from 2003, Certain Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe. Table 3 summarizes the data provided by the USITC investigation.
This case fits the criteria for Hypothesis 1, where the unit price of imports is lower than the domestic marginal cost of production. As the hypothesis predicted, US firms experienced immediate decline every year from 2000 to 2002, which should at least partially be attributed to import increase. In fact, both capacity utilization and total sales fell drastically during this time, despite the fact that the US consumption quantity stayed levelled. In the corresponding WTO dispute case, US-Line Pipe, the grounds for Korea's challenge of US safeguard measures rested on the interpretation of the phrase 'serious injury or the threat of serious injury', and not on the causation issues. 77 This model, for example, can be introduced for the purpose of meeting the 'threat of serious injury' requirement of Safeguard agreement, which is defined as 'serious injury that is clearly imminent'. Art. 4: Safeguard agreements 1 (b). Specifically, according to Hypothesis 2, if the price of imports is greater than the marginal cost of production but lower than the average cost of production, we would not see an immediate industry decline but an inevitable decline sometime in the future since firms cannot sustain economic losses for an infinite amount of time. This meets the 'clearly imminent' part of the requirement. Depending on how serious that injury is going to be, firms may be able to seek remedy under the Safeguard agreement. 78 In both cases, firms will produce up to the point where the marginal cost of production equals marginal revenue. 79 'Certain Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe: Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Import Relief', <www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations/2003/204_line_pipe/PDF/PUB3628.pdf>, 19 Jun. 2009. This figure does not include numbers for Japan and Germany, which were not provided by the USITC. 80 Average cost of production was calculated by adding per unit Selling, General, and Administrative (SG&A) expenses to the marginal cost of production figure. Table 4 shows data for the case of Certain Steel Wire Rod, which again fits under the definition of Hypothesis 1.
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This example is interesting because despite the fact that the price of imports was below the marginal cost of production (meaning that imports did indeed cause industry injury), the price increase and US total consumption increase between 2001 and 2002 suggests that the demand curve shifted to the right. So while we can blame import surge for some of the domestic industry harm, import increase cannot be the sole blame for domestic industry decline between 2001 and 2002. 82 Next is the Carbon and Alloy Long Steel (Hot Bar) case, illustrated in Table 5 . 83 In this case, the price of imports was higher than the average cost of production, fitting the rubric of Hypothesis 3. According to Hypothesis 3, we should not see domestic industry decline attributed to imports, since firms will continue to produce as long as their economic profit is greater than 0. In this case, domestic consumption stayed level or increased, and more importantly, import price was higher than the average cost of production. It is very difficult to argue in these cases that imports were causing domestic industry harm.
In the case of Welded Pipe, 84 the situation is more complicated but still well explained by our framework. Such discrepancy provides a good case study for analysing causal relationship between import surge and domestic industry harm. Imports, in absolute terms, actually declined between 2001 and 2003, both in absolute and relative terms. Even if imports increased, there are multiple reasons to believe that imports did not cause domestic industry harm. In particular, according to Hypothesis 2, the domestic production decline (in short tons) observed between 2001 and 2002 should not have been observed if it was due to imports, since firms would not have significantly alter their production decisions in the short run, as long as price of imports are above their marginal costs. It seems more likely that increase 84 Ibid.
in cost of raw material -as stated by the USITC -played a larger role in loss of output.
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The output loss in 2003 seems more attributable to imports, since costs of imports were now lower than domestic marginal cost of production. In fact, capital expenditure for domestic firms declined significantly, from USD 103,662,000 in 2002 to USD 67,801,000 in 2003. This stays consistent with Hypothesis 1, in which firms alter their long-term production capacity if prices fall below their marginal cost. The Fittings 86 case provides an excellent application of Hypothesis 3, where the price of imports is higher than the domestic average cost of production. This is the case in both 2002 and 2004. In 2001 and 2003, import price is higher than marginal cost but lower than average cost, which calls for application of Hypothesis 2. We see a total sales decline, in terms of dollars, from 2001 to 2003. Even assuming that significant import increase took place, 87 the domestic industry harm, it seems, cannot be attributed to imports. As Hypothesis 3 calls for, there should not be an immediate -nor long-term -decline in production attributed to As illustrated by the case examples, the 'Cost of Production Test' is useful because it, by design, helps address the burden of non-attribution, which is important for all cases where the price of imports are lower than the average cost of production for domestic firms. For example, if the price of import is greater than the domestic marginal cost of production but lower than the average cost of production, we can objectively attribute immediate industry decline to a factor other than import increase, since firms will not alter their production in the short run and, therefore, not show symptoms of decline attributable to import surge. If the price of import is lower than the marginal cost of production, we would see an immediate industry decline that should at least partially be attributed to import increase. This approach is also practically feasible. Cost of production figures are publicly available data published in financial statements in all publicly traded companies and in many privately owned companies. Unlike figures like the elasticity of goods that are almost always going to be subject to debate, cost of production figures cannot be easily manipulated for the purpose of seeking trade remedy, offering a degree of objectivity.
We acknowledge the following limits to our model. First, we assume that firms act rationality -which is often not the case. Yet, at the aggregate level, assuming firm rationality often best depicts the real world.
88 Second, although we improve upon Irwin and Kelly's model, there are still limitations associated with the original Elasticity Model: namely, subjective judgment goes into determining causality. Third, different industries have different long terms and short terms, which may hinder using a 'one-size-fits-all' test when using the 'Cost of Production Test'. For example, some industries may experience relatively quicker decline if the import price is higher than marginal cost and lower than average cost than other industries whose fixed costs are not alterable in a short span of time. Even given all of that, our model improves upon Kelly and Irwin's original model in terms of practicality and objectivity.
Observing the production costs also help reinforce the importance of examining cost of production that are central to anti-dumping and countervailing measures. Specifically, both investigative agencies and dispute panels should reject the assumption that only declining industries are entitled to anti-dumping and countervailing protection. The text of agreements for anti-dumping and countervailing requires, respectively, that 'significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute or relative terms' and 'a significant increase in subsidized imports'. 89 Nowhere in the text requires actual industry decline. While the Safeguard Agreements clearly define 'serious injury' as 'a significant overall impairment in the position of a domestic industry', 90 AD Agreement and SCM Agreement allow for a broad interpretation of harm: 'The examination of the impact. . .on the domestic industry shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry.'
91 That should include harms that occur to highly profitable industries as well as industries that are showing growth.
That being said, we are not advocating that national governments levy countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties whenever it is legally sanctioned. Many economists view subsidized imports and dumped imports as economically advantageous for importing nations and believe that only economic efficiency should guide international trade.
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In fact, it may seem counter-intuitive that dumping -which is a form of subsidization for consumers -is penalized under international trade law, since firms often price discriminate for different markets. Yet, national governments need to weigh more than economic efficiency in rendering policy decisions. The trade remedy system is founded on this very premise. Insofar as a country maintains and utilizes a trade remedy system pursuant to the WTO Agreements, our framework gives each country a better criteria to address causation analysis that is the critical element and yet terribly confusing. The Cost of Production Test provides WTO Members with an additional tool to meet legally deserving trade remedies, which can be exercised after weighing social, economic, and political costs into consideration.
SOLVING THE CAUSATION CONUNDRUM: THE INUS TEST
As reviewed in section 5.1, another problem raised by equating correlation and causation is when serious harm is done to growing or economically viable industries. This calls for examining the divergent purpose of different trade remedy measures. Specifically, we argue that the AD Agreement and SCM Agreement are in place for a very different reason than Safeguard Agreement. Anti-dumping and countervailing duties are in place to punish cheaters of the system if it causes or threatens to cause material injury to the importing nation. 93 Safeguard measures, on the other hand, is a measure that can be used even when everyone has acted appropriately under trade agreements. 94 Although there are many rationales for its existence, the strongest rationale presented seems to be that it offers a temporary shield to declining domestic industries, which 'reduce the risk of trade concessions under conditions of political uncertainty, and thereby facilitate more of them'. 95 That point is so important because it implies that we should set different causal proof burden for the two different scenarios. For anti-dumping and countervailing duties, smaller amount of harm -compared to safeguard cases -may be punished. In these cases, it matters less that domestic industries were seriously harmed or on the verge on collapse; it matters more that a party cheated, even in cases where correlation would not show because the harm is done to a prospering industry. For safeguard, the burden of proof for link between increased imports and serious injury is greater. The wording in Article 4.2(b) requires that imports establish a 'genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect', while the US statutory burden is to prove 'substantial causation'. According to the USITC, substantial causation means greater than any other causes, which is defined by the Trade Act of 1974. This is rather arbitrary. Of course, the definition is inclusive to the scenario where imports could account for 51% of the cause. If, however, there were 100 causes of domestic industry collapse, ninety-nine of which accounting for 0.99% each but import surge accounting for 1.99%, the current system would still view imports as the culprit. Irwin assesses that such system is non-explicit and loosely reasoned, producing some decisions that seem 'arbitrary and simply based on assertions'. 96 Indeed, this standard has caused problems at a number of trade disputes, which points out a need for a more fine-tuned definition of 'genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect'. One of the approaches suggested is mandating that increased imports itself is necessary and sufficient cause of serious injury, as ruled by the panel in US -Wheat Gluten Safeguard. This standard was reversed by the Appellate Body, and for good reason: while it is possible that the import be sufficient for serious harm, it is, in our minds, impossible that imports increase alone may be necessary for serious injury. Necessary condition means that no other factor -such as overall economic downturn, consumer taste shift, or natural disasters -could possibly be responsible for serious injury. Logically speaking, this is impossible, even if the standard allows that imports need not, by themselves, cause a threat of serious injury. 94 Safeguard provisions were adopted largely at the request of the United States, during the Uruguay Round negotiations. Many scholars view safeguard provisions as an insurance for trading nations that encourage more liberal trade policies. 95 Sykes, supra n. 1, at xxx. 96 Irwin, supra n. 65, at 303.
Another suggestion is a standard proposed by the Appellate Body that reversed the panel decision in US -Lamb Meat, which upheld their own decision in US -Wheat Gluten. In the decision, the Appellate Body stated that the Agreement on Safeguards did not require that increased imports be neither 'sufficient' nor 'alone' to cause or threaten to cause serious injury. This ruling seems equally mysterious to the standard proposed by the original ruling in Wheat Gluten. As Sykes points out intuitively, there is no point of non-attribution requirement if increased imports need not be sufficient to cause serious injury. 97 We articulate a logically consistent yet practically feasible standard for causation by applying and modifying the INUS model. The INUS test, introduced by philosopher John Mackie in 1965, attempts to explicate causality in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. 98 According to this test, C is a cause of E if and only if:
(1) C and E are both actual. (2) C occurs before E. (3) C is an INUS condition of E.
Here, the notion of an INUS condition is spelled out as follows: C is an INUS condition of E if and only if C is an Insufficient but Non-redundant part of a Condition, which is itself Unnecessary but exclusively Sufficient for E in the circumstances.
For the purposes of trade causation analysis, 'insufficient' implies that the import could not have caused harm alone -such as settlement of labour unions that allowed the goods to be produced in the first place. It is non-redundant; if absent this factor, the effect could not have possibly occurred within that cluster. It is unnecessary, because surely other factors can be combined as a cluster to cause the harm (say, for example, an economic downturn that eliminate demand for certain industries). The following provides an illustration: (A&B&C or D&E or G&H) $ Z A ¼ Import surge of TV B ¼ Production of the imported TV abroad C ¼ Low fuel cost that allowed the production parts of TV to be acquired sufficiently cheap D ¼ The Federal Reserve Bank's decision to increase interest rates by 0.5% E ¼ Investors' preference to save money instead of buying TV due to the interest rate change G ¼ Wal-Mart's decision not to sell domestic TV H ¼ Other retail stores' decision not to increase their stock of domestic TV Z ¼ Domestic TV Industry decline.
In this case, absent B or C, import surge would not have occurred. At the same time, B and C are not sufficient by themselves to cause Z. Yet, import surge is not a necessary condition to cause Z, since other factors, like combination of D&E or G&H could also cause Z.
In that sense, if it can sufficiently cause harm, then we can view import increase as a 97 Sykes, supra n. 1, at 179. 'substantial cause' of domestic industry decline. This burden of proof suits the safeguard agreement in accordance to the purpose of the agreements. In pure logical terms, this would eliminate cases where domestic industries merely took a role in causing industry decline -even if they are greater cause than any other cause -but not a cause that would be sufficient in itself to cause the industry decline. Instead, being sufficient but not necessary to cause harm requires that the disputing party show that import surge was the dispositive factor in causing industry harm.
Take the Wheat Gluten case, for example. In a written submission to the WTO panel, the USITC argued that imports were a substantial causation of harm by establishing temporal correlation: 'Correlating with this decline in industry performance, the USITC report found that imports of wheat gluten increased dramatically from their steady 1993-1995 level of 128 million pounds to 156 million pounds in 1996, and still further to 177 million pounds in 1997.'
99 Then, the USITC qualitatively compared import surge with alternative causes, including increase in raw material costs, competition among domestic producers, and changes in co-products. They concluded that import surge was a greater cause than each one of these causes. That seems rather strange, because in the same report, the USITC admitted that, 'raw material costs did increase during the Period of Investigation (POI), particularly in 1996 and 1997'.
100 If the premise of the import surge was mere temporal correlation, what precludes the correlation between raw material price increase and domestic industry harm from also being the culprit? 101 Aside from that logical inconsistency, USITC's test also failed the INUS condition, since they compared imports to each of the alternative causes, neglecting to consider the harm done by aggregates of other causes. Reference the following illustration: (A&B or C&D&E&F&G 102 ) $ Z A ¼ import surge of wheat gluten B ¼ the homogeneity of wheat gluten that allows imports to be perfect substitutes of domestic products C ¼ changes in co-product markets D ¼ domestic producers' importation of wheat gluten E ¼ competition among domestic producers F ¼ increased capacity G ¼ rising raw materials costs (wheat gluten and wheat flour) Z ¼ domestic wheat gluten industry decline.
In this case, by comparing A to C, D, E, F, and G independently, the USITC committed a serious error in neglecting to consider the combined effect of C, D, E, F, and G, which may have been sufficient as a cluster to cause the industry harm observed. Granted, the INUS condition allows for cases where multiple clusters may be responsible for an observed 99 Panel Report, US -Wheat Gluten, at 233. 100 Ibid., at 236. 101 Although the USITC brushes off such striking correlation by arguing that firms should have been able to pass the rising cost of goods to the consumer absent import surge, there is less credibility to this argument since wheat gluten is a homogeneous good competing in a perfectly competitive market.
102 Causes C, D, E, F, and G are the actual alternate causes proposed by the USITC.
outcome. 103 However, unless the USITC can supply more information than mere temporal correlation, it is hard to view imports as a sufficient cause of the import harm. In fact, as reasoned by the panel, 'injury factors were declining prior to the surge in imports found by the USITC in 1996-1997', 104 giving more reason to believe that the alternate causes had more to do with the industry decline than the import surge.
Granted, the INUS condition is a practically difficult standard to apply. For example, how do we define sufficiency? Should imports account for specific numerical percentage point of harm to be deemed the culprit? Assigning a specific number is always going to be controversial and likely lead to cherry-picking of data by disputed parties to conjure numbers that fit their argument. At the end of the day, scholars and practitioners alike should accept that some level of subjective judgments is unavoidable. Rather, they should pay attention to factual circumstances in each case and treat prior rulings as persuasive precedents to guide their judgment. While we think that the subjectivity of the INUS condition is its weakness, we also note its superiority to the standards presented in the panel ruling of US -Wheat Gluten (which is logically impossible) and the Appellate Body decision in US -Lamb (which undermines the very purpose of non-attribution requirement).
CONCLUSION
David Hume, in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, famously argued that causation itself is a meaningless phenomenon -a series of conjoined events that we presume to be causally related, but one that may equally be presumed not causally related.
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For example, even given the empirically strong preceding of a rooster's crow to sunrise, a reasonable person would not believe that a rooster's crow caused the sun to rise. To put it bluntly, causation is a phenomenon that cannot be proven; only correlation can be observed, which, coupled with strong reasoning and evidence, can be deduced to be causally related.
In the field of international trade law, causation is a central element in many trade remedy measures. Although sophisticated tools -from the Elasticity Model to the Partial Equilibrium Model -have been developed to address the need to assess causal relationships, the assumption that correlation equals causation has been widespread in previous WTO case law and extant literature in the field. In this article, we elucidate problems that stem from that assumption. First is the case where temporal correlation between dumping/illegal subsidizing and industry decline would not show even when there is genuine harm, simply because the industry is growing or is a lucrative industry. Second is the case where due to 103 For example, if Adam and Sarah shot a deer at the same time, and each of the bullets were sufficient to kill the deer, gunshots of both Adam and Sarah were independently sufficient to cause the death of the deer. This is the difference between the INUS condition and the condition articulated in the panel ruling in US -Wheat Gluten, the latter standard that argues that import surge must be both sufficient and necessary condition of the industry decline. 104 Panel Report, US -Wheat Gluten, para. 8.100. 105 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Filiquarian, 2007) .
the ubiquity of sunk costs, temporal correlation would not be shown due to lag in the decision-making processes of rational firms. This piece attempts to tackle such problem by improving upon Kelly's elasticity model. We first introduce the 'Cost of Production Test', which predicts the following: if the import price is below marginal cost, we should observe immediate decline attributed at least partially to imports; if the import price is between marginal cost and average cost, we should see some time lag in the harm done by imports; if the import price is higher than the average cost, industry decline cannot be attributed to import surge. Second, we suggest importing the INUS condition to define the 'genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect' requirement mandated by the safeguard agreement. This condition, although subjective in its own right, is a significant improvement from the previous definitions that were either logically infeasible or pointless in terms of meeting the non-attribution requirement.
